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Introduction
Modern microeconomics consists of two major parts: firm behaviour and consumer be-
haviour. Although they emerged at roughly the same time in history our models (and
understanding) of firm behavior tends to be much more sophisticated then those of con-
sumer behaviour. One difficulty in modelling consumer behaviour lies on the observation
that consumption is in many ways a social activity. This has been observed both in the
context of bandwagon behaviour or conspicuous consumption (Liebenstein, 1950; Smith,
1776 or Veblen, 1899) but also in the context of learning to consume (Witt, 2001). Con-
sumers often face incomplete information both about what is available, and how to “get
the most out of” the goods they consume. Agents learn about what is available and how
to use it from their friends and neighbours, among other sources. In addition, consumers
appear to form habits, depending on rules of thumb and past behaviour to guide their
future choices. These sort of interaction and path dependent effects make analysis of
consumer behaviour particularly challenging.
In this paper we model the dynamics of individual consumer behaviour and look at
its implications for the distribution of demand of goods over the social space. There
are empirical studies of this issue, reporting on the impact of social space on demand
(e.g. Birke and Swann, 2006), but those papers tend to explain their results through
network externalities. In this paper we use more general constructs and show that network
structure of social interactions can be reflected on demand. Key to the consumers decision-
making and thus to the dynamics of demand, is the consumers on-going, or repeated
valuation of her alternatives. In our model valuations have two parts: in the first, choice
dynamics are driven by the influence of consumer’s own consumption history. In the
other, dynamics are driven by the influence of neighbours’ consumption history. In short,
our consumers routinely decide which products to by. Consumption of a chosen product
increases the future valuation of this product for a consumer. Consumers also routinely
interact with their neighbours and exchange information about all the products on the
market. Based on the these information streams consumers further update their valuations
for each product.
The model can be interpreted in two ways. One is to say that there is an imperfect
informational structure in the economy and consumers are aware of that fact. In this
case consumers try to reduce uncertainty (Jacoby et al., 1994) in their decision process
by using two sources of information. One source source is the information they receive
through own experience (part 1). As consumers have the better understanding of the
value of the goods they have already consumed, consuming the same good avoids possible
disappointment. The other is the information they receive from their social networks
about the available goods (part 2). Information gathered from “friends” can similarly
reduce the risk of disappointment.
Another interpretation of the two parts of consumption dynamics would be that people
form habits for the goods they consume (part 1) and that there is an interdependence in
the utilities of nearby consumers (part 2). With regard to habit formation, we assume that
in the consumption process a consumer forms some special skills for using the product
and as a result receives somewhat higher utility every subsequent period she consumes the
same product. Interdependencies discussed on this interpretation are again only positive
and local. Here people get somewhat higher utility if their consumption bundle is similar
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to their neighbours’ consumption bundles. This is similar to the effect of a “peer group”
identified by Cowan et al. (1997).1
We solve this model for a particular set of initial conditions showing how consumption
choices can cluster in social space, and further how the stability of that clustering pattern
depends on parameter values. Solution of the model for arbitrary initial conditions is
not possible in general, so we address this issue numerically, showing that the results and
intuitions of the analytic solution carry over to the more general case.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly reviews
the related strands of literature. The second section presents the model. In the third
section we present an analytical solution to a special case of the model and some numer-
ical explorations into the behaviour of the general case. The last section of the paper
concludes.
1 Related literature
The early theoretical relaxations of the perfect informational structure assumption were
applied to market organization (see Rothschild, 1973 for a survey), credit rationing (e.g.
Jaffee and Russel, 1976, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) as well as to a general consumer be-
haviour (e.g. Nelson, 1970). Recently, consumers’ need for and lack of different types
of information have been studied more closely. For example, uncertainty about prices is
discussed by Galeotti (2004), who looks at the welfare implications of search costs when
the distribution of prices is unknown. Samuelson (2004) studies the implications of the
lack of information about the consumption of the population one lives in, by modeling
the interdependence among utilities of consumers. Similarly to Samuelson, in our model
consumers do not have information about the consumption of the whole population: each
agent observes only a small part of it.
As we noted earlier, consumers base their decisions (partly) on information coming
from external sources. Research in marketing and psychology stresses the immense im-
portance of information collection for the consumer decision process (Bettman, 1971),
and there is a vast body of empirical literature on how to collect and use consumer infor-
mation in marketing and psychology (see Babutsidze, 2007 for a review). People tend to
collect information through many different sources, such as the media, sellers or other con-
sumers. In this literature it seems that, if one accounts for the reliability of the external
information source and its intention to influence the information receiver, the information
received from peers, through social networks, is the most reliable (Hansen, 1972). Thus,
if one wants to understand the influence of external information on consumer decisions,
it seems reasonable to concentrate on information coming from peers, rather than from
any other external source. While not denying the importance of other sources of more
general external information, in this paper we focus on the effects of socially localized
peer effects.
The two-part informational paradigm (internal and external) taken by this paper is not
new in economics and has been applied to other related fields where agents have to make
choices. For example, information cascade models (e.g. Banerjee, 1992, and Bikhchandani
1Throughout the paper we combine these two sets of interpretations and call the the inertia force
“habit formation” (the second interpretation) and interdependency force - “information exchange”(the
first interpretation). The same applies to the title of the paper.
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et al., 1992) consider two sources of information based on which a certain decision is
made (in a setting of sequential choices among the consumers): private information and
external signals. In principle, the model presented in this paper is also an information
cascade model, but it differs from the conventional models in three ways. Firstly, choices
that consumers make in our model are repeated. This allows us to study the effects of the
change in internal information driven by the consumption process itself. Secondly, cascade
models typically present agents with only two options whereas in our model agents can
face an arbitrary (finite) number of options. Information about any option can form a
cascade as information about it flows within the population, but this does not dissolve
into a single binary choice for the agent. Rather agents use information (which may or
may not be cascading) about each of the options to make a choice for one of them. Finally,
in our model information about the decisions of other consumers is localized: consumers
can not see the decisions made by everyone in the population, but rather only those of
their neighbours.
Under the second interpretation of our mode presented above, the model relates to
the literature about the habit formation. Habit formation in consumption was discussed
early on by Deusenberry (1949) and Brown (1952). But these approaches were concerned
with the formation of the general habit of consuming, meaning that people form habits
to consume in general, not for some particular goods. More recently, the idea has been
rigorously incorporated into consumer decision models by Abel (1990) and Lettau and
Uhlig (2000). These studies are concerned with the formation of social consumption
habits (i.e. habits shared by the society). By contrast the present paper is concerned with
individual habit formation for a single-good. These are the habits that people develop
themselves through the consumption process, such as eating habits. Smith (2002), for
example, shows that people acquire very strong eating habits that persist for a long
period. He also shows that people are more likely to consume products that they see
other people consuming, which is a basic assumption of our model.
One more relevant strand of literature is about non-market interactions and the de-
bate about the different effects of global versus and interactions. Here the literature
contains models about non-market interactions between consumers and producers (e.g.
Scheinkman and Woodford, 1994, Weisbuch, 2006) as well as interactions among the con-
sumers (e.g. Eshel, et al. 1996, Cowan et al. 1997). In general, interactions generate
some kind of feedback loops that affect the decisions of the economic agents. As noted
by Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) the structure of those interactions does matter for
the outcome we obtain at the end. In particular, they show that when interactions are
local the economy generates more interesting dynamics, having multiple equilibria and
the possibility of moving from one equilibrium to another. More contextualized works on
interactions show that they can explain certain interesting phenomena in economics or
other social sciences, such as the standardization (or technology adoption) process (e.g.
Arthur, 1989, Cowan, 1991), waves in consumption across the population classes (Cowan
et al. 2004), “contagious justice”(Alexander and Skyrms, 1999) or standardized traits
(Altruists vs. Egoists) (Eshel et al. 1998).
Methodologically, the present paper closely relates to Dorofeenko and Shorish (2005),
who present a general framework using partial differential equations to study fixed strategy
games. But the work presented here is distinct from Dorofeenko and Shorish (2005) in two
major ways. Firstly, our model presented here can not be formulated as a fixed strategy
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game, indeed, part of our goal is to observe conditions under which strategies do or do not
change. Secondly, while they utilize the Fokker-Planck approximation to change the state
space from discrete to continuous, the state space in our model is continuous from the
beginning and the partial differential equation arises from Taylor series approximations.
2 The model
Consider an economy inhabited by a large, finite number (S) of agents. Each of them is
a single consumer, who, at every time period, chooses which goods to consume out of a
fixed set of available goods. All goods on the market are substitutes. They are indivisible
and a consumer can only consume a single unit of each.
An important notion in this paper is that of “valuation.” The valuation a consumer
ascribes to a given good is the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for it. Using
very basic consumer theory, the utility a consumer derives from the consumption of a
good will be the difference between its valuation and price that she pays for the good.
We adopt a standard discrete choice approach (Andersent et. al., 1992) and assume
that each consumer buys one and only one product each time period. Under this assump-
tion the utility of individual agent can be written as
U st = v
s
n∗,t, (1)
where vsn;t is the valuation of good n in period t for consumer s (net of price that she
has payed for the good) and n∗ is the good that consumer s has consumed in period t.
Under this setup the maximization of the utility implies that the the good that consumer
s chooses in period t is ns∗t = argmax(v
s
n;t).
What we seek to model here is the dynamics of product purchases based on the
changes in the valuations of all the consumers about all the goods available on the market.
Following the discussion in the introduction, we assume that valuation is derived from
information of two types: internal and external. So, we can write:
vsn;t = f(x
s
n;t, y
s
n;t), (2)
where the value of xsn;t is determined by own consumption history (part 1) and of y
s
n;t by
the consumption history of other people in the same social group as the given consumer
(part 2).
Both parts of the valuation are subject to change over time: xn;t is subject to change
due to habit formation and yn;t is subject to change due to information exchange.
2 Thus,
if we assume that f(·) is additive, we can write the dynamics of vsn as3
dvsn
dt
=
dxsn
dt
+
dysn
dt
. (3)
To model information exchange among consumers we assume that every consumer has
a fixed social location and a fixed neighbourhood. A neighbourhood is the set (Hs) of
2yn;t can be also interpreted as a network effect, and then its dynamics will be dependent on the
preferences of the (part of) society.
3From here on we drop the time subscript, but it should be borne in mind that the model is inherently
dynamic and it is implicitly present in all the variables used throughout the paper.
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other agents with whom an agent interacts and exchanges the information directly. Each
information exchange consists of two agents revealing to each other their private evalu-
ations of each of the goods. The information revealed is assumed to be “convincing” in
the sense that the post-exchange evaluations of each of the two agents partially converge.
Hence, this exchange process can be expressed simply in terms of the dynamics of beliefs
of a single agent, s, following her exchanges with all of her neighbours, i:
dysn
dt
=
∑
i∈Hs
µ(vin − vsn), (4)
where Hs is the set of agents in the neighbourhood of s, and µ (∈ [0, 1]) is the information
exchange parameter. Note that because we assume that all the products on the market
are substitutes and there are no ex ante systematic differences among consumers, the
information exchange parameter (µ) is the same across all the goods and agents.
Next, we give a shape to the social space. Assume that all consumers are aligned on
a circle such that the distance between any two agents corresponds to the social distance
between them, and the distance between immediate neighbours is constant across all the
population.4 In this case it is very easy to define the neighbourhood of an agent (Hs)
simply by specifying the number of agents with whom this consumer interacts on the left
and on the right.5
If we assume the neighbourhood size to be equal across the population, we can write
dysn
dt
= µ
H∑
h=1
[
(vs+hn − vsn) + (vs−hn − vsn)
]
, (5)
where s can be interpreted as a “serial number” of an agent, or her address (consequently,
s+1 and s−1 are her immediate neighbours from the right and from the left respectively).
Re-arranging, (5) can be rewritten as
dysn
dt
= µ
[
H∑
h=1
(vs+hn + v
s−h
n )− 2Hvsn
]
. (6)
Valuations are also influenced by habit formation.6 Habits are formed only for goods
that are consumed. Thus, dxsn/dt is equal to zero for the goods that are not consumed in
a certain period and is equal to some positive value for the good that has been consumed:
dxsn
dt
=
{
ζ if n = n∗
0 otherwise,
(7)
where ζ (> 0) is a constant.
4Note that the results of the model can be applied to any type of space besides the social (e.g. physical
space). It only depends on the interpretation of the circle on which the consumers are located.
5In general it is not crucial to assume that people have to be close socially in order to interact (although
this assumption is not very far from reality). The effects demonstrated in this paper would hold for any
type of network, be it social, geographical or any other type. The only requirement is that the society
has some kind of fixed structure over time and that every agent has the same number of connections.
6We should make clear, that by habit formation we mean individual habit formation, rather than
social habit formation which is a common assumption in ‘catching up with Joneses’-type of models (e.g.
Abel, 1990, Fuhrer, 2000).
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To summarize the model specified to this point we can make explicit sequence of
regular routines of consumers. At the start of each period every agent decides which good
to consume. After purchase she consumes it and forms habits for it. Towards the end of
the period each agent meets all of her neighbours and passes to them all the information
that she possesses. Based on the information communicated to them by neighbours all
agents adjust their valuations of all goods.
We are interested in whether this kind of behaviour has implications for the social
geography of demand; more precisely, whether any specific patterns emerge in the long-
run. Essentially we ask whether one can tell anything about the consumption basket of a
consumer by looking at the consumption baskets of her neighbours.
3 Analysis of the model
In this section we analyse the equilibrium and transition properties of the model. It is not
possible to solve a completely general form of the model, so in the process of solution we do
three things. First, we assume that the habit formation process can be well-approximated
(at least in the region of interest) by a linear function. Second, we re-write the model as
continuous in time and space. Finally we assume a specific initial condition.7 Following
this solution to specific cases, we provide numerical results on the more general case.
Habit formation. Above, equation (7) shows habit formation: a consumer forms habits
only for the good he consumes, and the effect on her valuation takes place in discrete
jumps. This describes a path dependent process. However, if we employ a strategy
used in the discrete choice literature (Andersen et al., 1992) to model expected habit
formation rather than realized habit formation we can approximate the dynamics of (7)
with a Markov process. We model the choice of the consumers as a conventional discrete
choice, where the choice is based on probabilities : agent s chooses good n with probability
psn;t at time period t. In this case, the law of motion in equation (7) becomes:
dxsn
dt
=
{
ζ with probability psn;t
0 with probability 1− psn;t. (8)
Further, psn;t will be a function of the vector of valuations for the agent s at period t.
Thus we can write psn;t = pn(V
s
t ), where V
s
t is the vector of valuations. Then the expected
change of xsn;t can be written as:
E
(
dxsn
dt
)
= ζpn(V
s
t ). (9)
Of course, the choice probability for a product n depends on valuations of all the prod-
ucts. But, the contribution of valuations of other goods (except that of n) are marginal,
especially if there are many products available on the market. Thus, our probability
function can be approximated by pn(V
s
t ) ≈ g(vsn;t). To obtain an analytic solution, it is
7This strategy for analysis of the model and its solution is borrowed from the model of chemical
morphogenesis (production and diffusion of chemicals among cells) from biology. In particular we rely on
Turing (1952) and Childress (2005).
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necessary to linearize g(vsn;t). The linearized form is simply g(v
s
n;t) ≈ γvsn;t, where γ > 0.
Then, the expected change of xsn;t can be written as
dxsn
dt
= αvsn, (10)
where α = γζ and can be interpreted as the rate of habit formation.8
Taking into account equation (10), our system can be written as
dvsn
dt
= αvsn + µ
[
H∑
h=1
(vs+hn + v
s−h
n )− 2Hvsn
]
. (11)
From (11) it is clear that the law of motion of valuation for every good for any agent
depends on its own level and on the valuations of the agent’s neighbours of that same
good.
For the demonstration of the solution, assume that each agent has exactly two neigh-
bours (H = 1), and that there are only two goods available on the market (N = 2). These
two assumptions reduce the model a system of S pairs of equations of the form
dvs1
dt
= αvs1 + µ(v
s+1
1 + v
s−1
1 − 2vs1) (12)
dvs2
dt
= αvs2 + µ(v
s+1
2 + v
s−1
2 − 2vs2), (13)
where s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , S − 1 and S is the number of consumers in the economy.
Continuous time and space. We seek to obtain the solution to this system given
by (12) and (13). As the choices are probabilistic, and probabilities are proportional to
utility levels, higher valuation for one good compared to the other (for a certain consumer)
would mean a higher probability that it will be bought by this consumer. Thus, as we
have only two products, we are only interested in the difference between the valuations
of these products. This is convenient as we can define a new variable zs = vs1 − vs2 and
rewrite the system (12)-(13) as
dzs
dt
= αzs + µ
(
zs+1 + zs−1 − 2zs
)
. (14)
To solve this relation for z, introduce the variable ∆, which is the distance between
two neighbours on the circle. This will allow us to discuss s as a variable, which will be
(yet another) argument of z. With this modification the equation above becomes
dzs
dt
= αzs + µ
(
zs+∆ + zs−∆ − 2zs
)
. (15)
Then we can make a second order Taylor approximation in space around s for the
terms zs+∆ and zs−∆. This will result in
8From here on, we drop the expectation sign, although it should be remembered that all the discussion
in this section is about the expected values of the variables.
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zs+∆ ≈ zs +∆dz
s
ds
+
∆2
2
d2zs
ds2
(16)
and
zs−∆ ≈ zs −∆dz
s
ds
+
∆2
2
d2zs
ds2
. (17)
Substituting equations (16) and (17) into equation (15) and considering the case when
∆→ 0, which is, when the number of agents becomes very large, we get a partial differ-
ential equation of a following form
∂z
∂t
= αz + µ˜
∂2z
∂s2
, (18)
where µ˜ = µ∆2.9
The local existence and uniqueness, as well as the analyticity of the solution to any
partial differential equation (such as (18)) is guaranteed by the Cauchy-Kowalewski the-
orem (Dorofeenko and Shorish, 2005). But this also requires analytic initial conditions.10
In the following section we discuss the solution of (18) when initial conditions are analytic.
Some insights to the dynamics of the model when initial conditions are not analytic will
be provided in section 3.2.
3.1 Analytical solution to a special case
To analyze this system it is useful to separate the dynamics of zst into the dynamics of
the average z¯t over the population and the dynamics of the deviations from this average
z˜st = z
s
t − z¯t.
Let’s look at the dynamics of average (z¯) first. By the definition z¯ = (1/S)
∑
s z
s.
This implies that
dz¯
dt
=
1
S
∑
s
dzs
dt
.
Using equation (15) we can write
dz¯
dt
= α
1
S
∑
s
zs + µ
1
S
∑
s
(
zs+∆ + zs−∆ − 2zs
)
. (19)
Noticing, that the second summand of the right hand side of the equation (19) is zero
and using the definition of average once again permits us to write (19) as
dz¯
dt
= αz¯. (20)
This is a simple ordinary differential equation that has a solution
z¯t = e
αtz¯0, (21)
9From now on we only use z but it should be kept in mind that it really is zst .
10“Analytic initial conditions” simply means that the initial condition can be expressed as a function.
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where z¯0 is the difference between averages (over the population) of the valuations of
the two products at time zero. Thus the difference in average valuations of the products
grows exponentially in time. Clearly if at any time z¯ is not zero, one of the products
is somehow perceived as superior, and this perceived superiority increases, exponentially,
without bound.
Now we turn to the dynamics of the deviation from the average (z˜).For obtaining the
analytical solution for deviations from the averages we need to specify an analytic initial
condition. As we are working with the deviations from the average, we know that initial
conditions should satisfy the constraint that
∑
s z˜
s
t = 0, which means that the average of
these values across the population should be zero all the time.
There are probably many interesting initial conditions worth analyzing, but one par-
ticularly appealing one for the study of clustering is
z˜s0 = cos
(
k
2pi
l
(s− sˆ0)
)
ˆ˜z0, (22)
where
ˆ˜s0 = argmax
x∈[0, lk ]
cos
(
k
2pi
l
x
)
and
ˆ˜z0 = z˜
ˆ˜s0
0 .
Also, pi is a measure of angle in radians, l is the length of the circle on which our consumers
are aligned and k is the frequency of the sine wave in the initial condition, which takes
non-negative integer values. Equation (22) implies that there is an initial clustering in
preferences.11
It can be shown (Childress, 2005) that in this special case (when the initial condition
is given by (22)) the solution to our system (18) is
z˜ = eσt cos
(
k
2pi
l
(s− sˆ0)
)
ˆ˜z0, (23)
where σ is the parameter yet to be determined. To find it we can simply substitute the
solution (23) into the equation (18) and notice that ∂2 cos(βx)/∂x2 = −β2 cos(βx). This
gives us the value of σ:
σ = α− µ˜k2
(
2pi
l
)2
. (24)
In order to combine the solutions for averages and deviations from averages consider
the case where z¯0 6= 0. That is, one of the products is perceived as superior. By equation
(20) we can see that this perceived superiority increases without bound. In this case,
although initially some of the consumers prefer the “inferior” product and their choices are
reinforced by habit formation (and maybe even by information received from neighbours),
at some point in time they will certainly be pushed to switch their choice. To see this
mathematically assume that z¯0 > 0 and consider the choice of the agent who has the
11The exception to this is the case when k = 0, which means a zero frequency sine wave, or equivalently,
that z˜s0 is constant across consumers. Then, as the average of deviations should be zero, k = 0 also means
that all the deviations are zero.
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lowest z = zmin, which will be negative.
12 Note that z¯ − zmin is equal to the half the
amplitude of the wave. Also assume that σ > 0.13 From equation (23) we know that the
amplitude of the waves around the average is increasing at rate σ, while the average itself
is increasing with rate α (equation (20)). Equation (24) establishes that α > σ unless
µ = 0. α > σ guarantees that z¯ increases faster than the amplitude of the pattern wave,
which implies that eventually zt becomes positive even for this extreme consumer.
Thus, z¯0 6= 0 is a relatively trivial case, and implies that ultimately only one product is
consumed in the population, no matter the dynamics of the deviations from the average.
Far more interesting is the case in which z¯0 = 0, and thus z¯t = 0, which permits both
products to co-exist indefinitely. From here on this is the case that we analyze. If z¯t = 0,
it is true that z˜st = z
s
t . Thus, simple replacement of z˜ by z in equation (23) will give the
complete dynamics of the case which we are interested to analyze.
If we fix the distance between the agents to be equal to unity (∆ = 1),14 this will
make µ˜ = µ and l = S, where S is the number of agents in the economy. This will help to
simplify the solution to (23). Using these modifications, the result obtained in (23) can
be rewritten as
zst = exp
((
α− µk24pi
2
S2
)
t
)
cos
(
k
2pi
S
(s− sˆ0)
)
zˆ0, (25)
where
sˆ0 = argmax
x∈[0,Sk ]
cos
(
k
2pi
S
x
)
and
zˆ0 = z
sˆ0
0 .
This is the final solution of the model. It determines the value of z for every agent
for every period in time. As one can notice at every period the distribution of z along
the circle has a form of waves, which points to the fact that in some neighbourhoods z
is positive, while in some other neighbourhoods it is negative. That means that some
neighbourhoods are more likely to buy one product, while some other neighbourhoods
are more likely to buy the other with a gradual transition between them. And the size of
these neighbourhoods is equal to S/(2k).
According to the Cauchy-Kowalewski theorem, the solution given in (25) is locally
unique. To ensure the global uniqueness of the solution we have to have boundary condi-
tions in space (Dorofeenko and Shorish, 2005). Recall that we are studying the unidimen-
sional torus (a circle) and in space agents’ addresses run from zero to S − 1. Then, agent
S should also be agent zero. Thus the intuitive boundary condition is z0t = z
S
t . It is easy
to see, that our solution (25) satisfies this boundary condition, thus is globally unique.
12If zmin > 0 everybody prefers one product over another, which is a stable pattern, thus not interesting
to discuss.
13If σ < 0, from equation (23) amplitude of the wave goes to zero and the difference between valuations
of two goods become homogeneous across the population.
14Note, that ∆ = 1 does not undermine the validity of the continuous approximation of the system
where we assumed ∆ → 0. ∆ = 1 in this case means going from actual measure of distance back to
consumer location indexes for the sake of interpretation of the results.
11
3.1.1 Discussion of the solution
Stability. A key concern is whether any observed clustering is persistent over time.
Whether or not this is the case depends on the stability of the solution of equation (18),
namely equation (25), which is written as:
zst = e
σt cos
(
k
2pi
S
(s− sˆ0)
)
zˆ0.
This is clearly dependent on the sign of σ; if σ < 0 the solution is stable, converging to
zst = 0 and, thus clustering in demand is a temporary phenomenon; whereas if σ > 0
we have an unstable solution to (18), the amplitude of the waves is ever-increasing and
clustering in probabilistic purchases becomes more and more pronounced with time.
Recall that
σ = α− µk24pi
2
S2
. (26)
Thus, stability depends on the constellation of parameters α, µ and S, as well as on the
value of k, which is part of initial condition.
A helpful construct to analyze the stability properties of the model is the cut-off value
of k (let’s denote it by k¯). The cut-off is defined as the highest possible value of k under
which the system is unstable, which means the initial clustering is permanent. As the
stability of the clustering requires σ ≥ 0 we can pin down k¯ by solving (26) for k, setting
σ = 0 and recalling that k takes non-negative integer values. This gives us the cut-off
k¯ =
⌊
S
2pi
√
α
µ
⌋
. (27)
Equation (27) implies, that given the ratio between α and µ, and S the initial sine
waves with frequency 0 < k ≤ k¯ generate long-lasting clustering patterns, while any other
value results in disappearance of neighbourhoods with time. The dependence of k¯ on α/µ
and S is positive and monotonic. This implies that higher values of α/µ and/or higher
values of S will support stability of smaller neighbourhoods.
As k is the frequency of the waves in valuation, clusters alternate regularly around
the circle, with the size of each cluster being S/(2k). If k is very large (k = S/2 in the
extreme case) each individual constitutes one cluster. In this case each agent is susceptible
to influence from both her neighbours, both proponents of the choice contrary to the one
the agent has made. All the agents receive negative reinforcement from their neighbours.
This is likely to produce an unstable pattern. By contrast, if k is small, most agents are in
the middle of a cluster surrounded by like-minded agents. In that case most agents receive
external information that reinforces their choice. This is likely to be a stable situation.
Intuitions. Besides k, σ depends on parameters α, µ and S. From equation (26) the
relation with each of the parameters can be specified:
∂σ
∂α
> 0;
∂σ
∂µ
< 0;
∂σ
∂S
> 0. (28)
Therefore, higher α, lower µ and higher S would all contribute to σ being positive, and
thus a hardening of the community structure over time, for a given k.
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These results have an intuitively appealing interpretation. Recall that the parameter
α governs habit formation. A higher α would further reinforce the existing geographic
pattern. If habits form quickly, what an agent consumes today is likely to be what he or she
consumes tomorrow as well. Information received from neighbours has a smaller (relative)
effect. In the extreme, if α is large enough, the first good consumed by any agent will
be the only good consumed by that agent. The spatial pattern of consumption is frozen
from the first day. Any clustering that exists is stable. On the other hand if α is so small
that σ becomes negative, the clustering with a given k is not stable. In this case, agents
decisions are dominated by information they receive from neighbours. But over the entire
population, information is contradictory — some prefer good one, some prefer good two.
Gathering all the contradictory information, any agent soon comes to the opinion that the
goods deserve roughly equal valuations. All choices are made by coin flipping, and any
spatial pattern disappears. µ is the parameter for information diffusion. A higher µ would
mean a faster diffusion of the information and, consequently, a faster homogenization of
information structure of population. Again, by the same process as happens with a small
α, this process would work against any geographical pattern. Increasing the population
size, (S), is a further obstacle in the way of information diffusion, and so slows down the
homogenization process. Essentially what we observe here is a tension between own and
public information. When agents lean heavily on the former, it tends to freeze choices,
and any spatial pattern that exists will be relatively stable. When agents lean heavily
on the latter, the initial condition that on average the goods are perceived as equally
valuable drives agents towards indifference between the goods, and this the dissipation of
spatial patterns towards random choices.
Now, recall that we have solved the model only for H = 1 and N = 2. It is also
interesting whether these two variables have any influence on the stability of the system.
In the appendix we have given the solution to the system with arbitrary H and arbitrary
N . The case of N > 2 does not change the stability properties of the system, as σ remains
as defined in equation (26). Thus, an increase in the number of goods does not have any
effect on stability.
When H takes on arbitrary values, the solution for σ becomes
σ = α− µk24pi
2
S2
H∑
h=1
h2. (29)
From here, it is obvious that ∂σ/∂H < 0, thus a larger neighbourhood implies that σ
is positive for a smaller region of α × µ × S × k space. This is also intuitive as a larger
neighbourhood facilitates the information diffusion process, which works to homogenize
the information structure across the population.
3.2 General case
In the previous section we have given the analytic solution to a special case of the model.
This solution (25) was based on a specific analytic initial condition, namely that relative
preferences for the two goods were distributed over the population in a sine wave. An ob-
vious question is how the model behaves starting from other initial conditions. Addressing
this question is part of the goal of the current section. The most general case is when the
initial valuations are random. In this case initial conditions are non-analytic, thus an an-
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alytical solution is not possible, but we can analyze the model numerically. This will also
give us an opportunity to demonstrate the validity of the methodology used for solving
the special case analytically and to ensure that the results and intuitions developed there
carry over to more general models, and in particular to the model as originally described
in section 2.
This section presents typical runs of three specifications of the model. The structure
of these experiments is to move incrementally from the model as solved in section 3.1,
towards the model as originally described in section 2. Thus we present first the expected
development of the model of section 3.1 but with a particular specification of the choice
probabilities. Next we show the actual development of the model when habit formation
takes place only on the good that the consumer is consuming at any moment. Finally, we
show a simulation of an original model.
The main question in each case is whether any clustering emerges, and if so, whether
it is stable. In all three cases the answer to the first question is that clustering does
emerge. But we must point out that it is not stable, but rather meta-stable. One of
the conditions for stability (see section 3.1) is that the average valuation of the goods
over the population must be equal. If they are not equal, then the good with the higher
average valuation dominates all other goods (exponentially) over time (see equation (21)).
With non-analytic initial conditions we can not guarantee that z¯t = 0 for all time periods
(although it can be imposed for the first period (z¯0 = 0)). Thus, since choices are random
(even though the probability distribution is governed by valuations) at some point one of
the products will become perceived as “superior” on average and we collapse to the case
identified as trivial in previous section.
Settings. In each of the experiments reported below, we use the following parameter
values. We set the number of goods to N = 10.15 The population size is S = 100; the
population is located on a one-dimensional periodic lattice, so the neighbours of agent
0 are agents 1 and 99. The specific parameters for habit formation, α and information
diffusion µ are α = 0.001 and µ = 0.01. Finally, each agent has one neighbour on
either side, H = 1.16 To read the figures below, agents are arrayed along the abscissa,
remembering that the axis is a circle, so the right-most and left-most agent are neighbours.
Time is read on the ordinate, from the initial period, t = 0 to the final period, t = 2000.
Each good is assigned a different shade of gray. The ordering of the goods, and therefore
the shades of gray, is arbitrary. At each point in time the choice (or the good with the
highest valuation) for each agent is shown by the colour corresponding to that good.
Finally, we specify the function mapping valuation to the probability of choice. Here
we simply adopt the multinomial logit, from discrete choice theory:
pn(V
s
t ) =
ev
s
n;t∑
i∈N
ev
s
i;t
, (30)
where N is the set of all available products.
15We expand the number of goods for reasons of generality. We have shown (in the appendix) that
number of products does not affect the stability of the system.
16Note that for this constellation of the parameters k¯ = 5.
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Figure 1: The most preferred goods (left) and actual purchases (right) with probabilistic
purchases, and expected habit formation.
The equivalent model. In figure 1 we show the development of the model specified in
section 3.1, with the laws of motion given by equation (11). The only difference between
the numerical results presented here and the analytic solution is that that here we use
random initial conditions: for each agent-product pair a vsn;0 is drawn from the uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 20].17 In the left panel of figure 1 we show the most
preferred good; in the right panel we show actual choices. As one can see, despite the
random initial values, the clustering pattern is clearly identifiable for the most preferred
goods after few periods. The same pattern is replicated (although with some noise) by the
actual purchases. Actual choices differ from the preferred good due to the probabilistic
choice function (equation (30)). This difference is especially marked near the borders of a
region, since here agents receive contradicting information about products, which tends to
reduce the difference between their valuations of the most preferred good and other goods.
This makes the probability choice function relatively flat for agents near the borders of
clusters, and choices less correlated with those of their neighbours.
Specific habit formation. Figure 2 also shows the expected ddynamics of the model.
But in this case we model habit formation as occurring only on the product currently
17Changing the uniform distribution to other standard symmetric distributions does not change the
results of simulations.
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Figure 2: The most preferred goods (left) and actual purchases (right) with probabilistic
purchases and habits formed only on the purchased good.
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Figure 3: Consumers purchase their preferred good deterministically, with ζ/µ = 1 (left)
ζ/µ = 0.5 (middle) and ζ/µ = 0.25 (right), showing the negative relationship between
(minimum) neighbourhood size and ζ/µ.
being consumed, and in discrete jumps (as in equation 7), in contrast to the analytical
model in which we modelled expected habit formation. This model is distinct from the
previous, in that here we use a habit formation step of ζ instead of habit formation rate
α. We know that ζ = α/γ where γ is the constant coming from the linearization of the
choice probabilities. Unfortunately there is no way to pin down the value of γ. Due to
this we cannot make a judgment about the relation between magnitudes of α and ζ, thus
the choice of the value of ζ is somehow arbitrary. We choose ζ = 0.005 and use the same
values for all other parameters as in the previous run. As one can see (in figure 2), again
the clustering in purchases is clearly visible and relatively stable.
Original model. Finally, we simulate the original model, as developed in section 2 with
the same parameter settings as in simulation 2. This final simulation should demonstrate
the validity of the general approach of formulating a Markov process for the approximation
of the behaviour of the original path-dependent model. In this case we move away from
the probabilistic choice function to a deterministic one: the most preferred products
are purchased (as implied by the consumer utility maximization problem) and habits
are formed only for these goods (equation (7)). A typical run of the original mode is
presented on the middle pannel of figure 3. Once again, a specific pattern in demand
across neighbourhoods is clearly identifiable, even though we start, again, from random
initial conditions.
Figure 3 also demonstrates that the discussion in section 3.1.1, about the effects of
the parameters on outcomes in analytical model, carries over to this general model as
originally described in section 2. As shown in equation (27) the stability properties of the
model depend on the value of α/µ. We know that α = γζ and as γ is constant throughout,
these properties should depend on the value of ζ/µ.18 We take the middle panel of figure
3 as the benchmark (recall that the parameter values here are equal to those used for
figure 2) and create two other cases for comparison. The left panel of figure 3 shows the
case when ζ/µ is twice as large as the benchmark run, while the right panel shows the
18They will also depend on a size of the economy (S). However, the effect of S is simply that the
minimum sustainable neighbourhood size is linear in S−1, (equation (27)), so we limit ourselves to
showing the effects of ζ/µ.
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case when ζ/µ is half as large. As one can see larger ζ/µ permits smaller neighbourhoods
to survive for a longer period. If one takes into account the fact that the presence of
multiple clusters is a metastable phenomenon, these results can be thought as corollary
to our discussion of results of analytical model in section 3.1.1, as there higher ζ/µ would
result in smaller neighbourhoods being stable in the long run.
These numeric exercises also permit us to make a comment about what revealed pref-
erences cannot reveal. Revealed preferences give us information only about the most
preferred product, namely which it is, and completely neglect the story that is going on
in the background. By this we refer to the fact that agents do have preferences over,
and information about the goods they do not in fact consume. Without acknowledging
the importance of those “unexpressed” preferences it is difficult to understand a sudden
change in consumption which is not simply imitating neighbours. This is something that
is possible in our approach, and in fact is observed in figure 3, in all three panels.19 We
observe several cases of an agent adopting a new good which neither of her neighbours
consumes. In addition, in many cases the agent himself has never consumed it in the
past. The explanation lies in the fact that an agent close to the border of a region can
receive contradictory signals. Consider the following simple example. Agent s − 1 ranks
good 1 first and good 3 last; agent s+ 1 ranks good 3 first and good 1 last. Both agents,
though, rank good 2 second. It is clear that agent s, based on her external information,
could easily rank good 2 before either 1 or 3. If the high rankings of good 2 by s− 1 and
s+1 have emerged (due to information received by their neighbours) at roughly the same
time, agent s can then switch to good 2, regardless of what he was doing in the past.
This explains the emergence and growth of such neighbourhoods in our framework. Thus,
our model is consistent not only with shrinking and disapearance of smaller geographical
neighbourhoods, but also with the emergence and growth of new ones.
Concluding remarks
As we have seen in this paper, information streams through fixed social networks do
affect the social geography of demand. These external information sources, together with
internal information processing structures such as habit formation, generate rich demand
dynamics for markets containing goods that are close substitutes. In an environment of
static budget constraints, information diffusion through fixed social networks generate
clustering in demand: some neighbourhoods collectively prefer one good over another,
while other neighbourhoods do exactly the opposite. Depending on the characteristics
of the society, this pattern can be fragile, or robust. In short, what we have seen in
this paper is that several parallel informational cascades can result in persistent spacial
distributions where clearly identified neighbourhoods have higher concentrations of one
particular type of information (information about one product). Or to put it differently,
where the peaks of different positive informational cascades (Hirshleifer, 1993) are located
19In the left panel, product emergence of this sort is relatively common: agent 66 at period 10; agent 24
at period 100; agent 85 at period 5. In the middle panel, agent 92 at period 200; in the right panel, agent
66 at period 5. Close examination of the figures shows that this is in fact relatively common, though
happening earlier in the right and middle panels than in the left panel. There is also a nice example in
figure 1: agent 60, at about time 1000, changes her consumption from the good he has been consuming
for the past 600 periods to a good he has never before consumed.
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in different places in social space.
It worth noting that stable clustering phenomena can also be obtained with simpler
models. For example one can model consumers as celular automata, who are basing their
decisions on purely neighbours’ current states (for example Miller and Cowan, 1998). Our
model differs from these specifications in two ways: firstly, we can discuss the importance
of communication intensity, which is impossible in celular automata and secondly, in our
model consumers exchange information about the merits of (all) the products with their
friends instead of just observing their consumption baskets.
Another interesting aspect worth pointing out is the localized nature of interactions.
One interesting question is how introducing some global interactions would change in out-
comes. This can be analyzed by looking at the behavior of the model as neighbourhoods
become very large (H → S/2). Increasing H puts a downward pressure on k¯, and very
likely pushes it below unity,20 which means that no long-run clustering will be stable (in
case of products having the same quality). Thus, in line with Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2000), our model demonstrates that local interactions result in richer and more complex
dynamics of the model compared with global interactions.
One important shortcoming of the model that has to be mentioned is that under this
methodological framework we can not say anything about the selection of equilibria. We
have identified the large set of possible scenarios with respect to the long-run development
of the system, but we can not say which of them is more likely to occur. By looking at
the assumptions that we had to impose in order to solve the model, one can argue that
this will depend purely on initial conditions of the system, which is not surprising given
the path-dependent features of the model.
Appendix
In appendix we give the analytical solution to the model with two neighbours and two
goods assumptions being relaxed. We consider them one by one.
Appendix A: H > 1 case
Here we relax the two neighbours assumption. We consider a general case of every agent
having 2H neighbours, thus we directly work with the equation (11) in the paper. After
assuming that the distance between every two agents on the circle is equal to ∆, equation
(11) can be rewritten as follows
dvsn
dt
= αvsn + µ
[
H∑
h=1
(vs+h∆n + v
s−h∆
n )− 2Hvsn
]
. (31)
Let’s consider only the second summand in the equation above (as it is the only part
affected by the neighbourhood size). It has a form21
µ
(
vs+H∆ + vs+(H−1)∆ + . . .+ vs+∆ + vs−∆ + . . .+ vs−H∆ − 2Hvs
)
. (32)
20For example, in the small economy that we have simulated (S = 100), H = 49 implies that the value
of α has to be around 160 times higher than the value of µ in order the system to be stable for the largest
possible neighbourhoods (k¯ = 1).
21Hereafter we drop the good subscripts as this applies to every good in the system.
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Now, if we apply a Taylor approximation of all the summands (except the last one)
around vs many of the terms will cancel out. First notice that the number of terms
approximated is 2H and each of the approximations will contain the term vs. All of these
terms together will cancel out with the last summand in the equation above. Plus, the
first order terms of all the expansions will also cancel out as each of them will appear in a
pair: one with positive and one with negative sign (as the neighbourhood is symmetric).
So, basically we are left with the second order terms. If we go to a continuous space we
will get
µ
(
H2∆2
∂2v
∂s2
s
+ (H − 1)2∆2∂
2v
∂s2
s
+ . . .+ 12∆2
∂2v
∂s2
s)
. (33)
Collecting terms we get
µ
((
H2 + (H − 1)2 + · · ·+ 12
)
∆2
∂2v
∂s2
s)
. (34)
Or
µ
(
∆2
(
H∑
h=1
h2
)
∂2v
∂s2
s)
. (35)
From this it stems that the only modification that this generalization makes can be
captured by the definition of µ˜ in the text being changed to
µ˜ = µ∆2
(
H∑
h=1
h2
)
. (36)
Although, notice here, that as we have used the Taylor approximation to derive this
result, as we consider larger and larger neighbourhoods the accuracy of the result deteri-
orates.
Appendix B: N > 2 case
Here we relax the two goods assumption. Let’s consider the N good case. After applying
a Taylor approximation procedure to all the equations (in this case N) in specification
(12)-(13), the model can be written as the system of N equations of a following form
∂vsn
∂t
= αvsn + µ˜
∂2vsn
∂s2
. (37)
After defining two N ×N dimensional diagonal matrices, one A with only α’s on the
diagonal and the other M˜ with µ˜’s on the diagonal, and three vectors, V which is the
vector of vns,
22 ∂V/∂t and ∂2V/∂s2 which contain first derivatives with time and second
derivatives with space, the system defined in (37) can be written in a matrix form
∂V
∂t
= AV + M˜
∂2V
∂s2
. (38)
22We drop the agent superscript here as it applies to every agent.
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It can be shown (Childress, 2005), that with initial condition equivalent to (22) the
solution to (38) is
V = eσt+iw(s−sˆ0)V0, (39)
where V0 is a vector of initial values and w = k(2pi/l). In writing the initial condition
(39) we consider the case, when average valuations across consumers of all the products
are equal to each other all the time, which is equivalent to the case z¯t = 0 considered in
the main body of the paper. Note, that the real part of (39) can be written as
V = eσt cos (w(s− sˆ0))V0,
which is the same as (23).
For the analysis of the stability of the system we again need to determine σ. Doing the
same trick as in the paper (taking the first derivative with time and the second derivative
with space and plugging back to the original equation), we get the following expression
(A−B)V0 = 0, (40)
where A is the same matrix of coefficients, while B is a new diagonal matrix, which has
µ˜w2 + σ terms everywhere on the main diagonal. So we get a new N × N dimensional
diagonal matrix of a form
α− µ˜w2 − σ 0 · · · 0
0 α− µ˜w2 − σ · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · α− µ˜w2 − σ
 ,
determinant of which has to vanish for the nontrivial solution of the system. The deter-
minant of the matrix above is easy to calculate: the determinant of a diagonal matrix is
the product of its diagonal entries, so
Det = (α− µ˜w2 − σ)N . (41)
Equating the determinant to zero and plugging the definition of w gives the opportu-
nity to solve for σ
σ = α− µ˜k2
(
2pi
l
)2
, (42)
which is absolutely the same as the solution obtained for the N = 2 case. Thus, this
system, of course, has N solutions but all of them are given by (42).
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